Economic theory predicts that performance evaluation gains meaning and accuracy if the performance is compared to peers, as described by Relative Performance Evaluation theory (or: RPE). RPE can be deployed as a means for standard-setting based on peer group performance, by incorporating the performance of a reference group of agents in the compensation plan. Nonetheless, research on RPE suggests that peer comparison is not often a part of the performance evaluation, at least at the CEO level. This research proposal argues that RPE needs also to be studied at lower echelons. Amongst business unit-managers, we believe, RPE can make a significant contribution to opportunism-mitigation. By externally determining the performance standards, targets are less easily influenced by the managers whose compensation depends on them. This extends the interpretation of RPE, a phenomenon that has been analysed primarily from the perspective of efficient risk sharing and informativeness. Building on the literature on RPE, the objective of this research proposal is to study the incidence and form of relative performance evaluation at the business unit level, and to explore contingencies that are associated with empirical (non)-existence of RPE. Extant RPE models do not consider the influence of contingency factors on RPE's applicability or desirability. This proposal presents a preliminary contingency model which aims to further our understanding of RPE. An additional contribution of this study derives from its direct, survey based approach, as opposed to the mostly indirect, public data based prior research. This allows for a deeper examination of RPE in practice, yielding stronger tests.
Introduction
One traditional tenet of agency theory is that it makes good economic sense to tie managerial compensation to performance. Such a compensation scheme would help to align the goals of managers with those of their principals, and would help to induce the level of managerial effort the principal seeks. Prior research in incentives has focused on the choice of performance measures and pay-performance sensitivities, but has largely ignored standard setting as such, i.e. how firms decide on the level of performance required to attain one's bonus (Ittner and Larcker, 2001; Merchant et al., 2003 , Anderson et al, 2006 . This is unfortunate, because the performance standard choice is an important and consequential dimension of the incentive structure (Murphy, 2001 ).
There are two main ways in which standards can be set (Murphy, 2001) : (1) they can be determined in some internal, administrative process; or (2) they can be externally determined. The difference between these alternatives lies in the extent to which agents can influence the standard-setting process. Internally determined standards include standards based on prior-year performance and standards derived from company plans or budgets. Such standards are affected by managers' actions, and can have dysfunctional effects. For example, when standards are based on prior-year performance, managers have incentives to avoid unusually positive outcomes, because good performance in the current period is penalized through an increased standard in the next period. In a similar vein, budget-based standards provide incentives to negotiate easy standards and disincentives to beat the budget, especially in a regime of incremental budgeting. In contrast, externally determined standards are less affected by managers' actions. For instance, managers can hardly influence the performance of an industry peer group, and therefore standards based on such external benchmarks leave less room for managerial opportunism.
These considerations suggest that the choice of the performance standard matters. More particularly, they indicate that contractual efficiency can be improved by incorporating the performance of a reference group of agents in the compensation plan. This extends the interpretation of relative performance evaluation (RPE), a phenomenon that has been analysed primarily from the perspective of efficient risk sharing and informativeness (Holmström, 1982) . Extant RPE models argue that as measured performance is almost always affected by random factors beyond the agent's control, contracts based solely on observed individual outcomes expose the agent to substantial risk. However, to the extent that these factors are common to all firms in an industry or market, RPE allows the associated uncertainty to be filtered out. RPE, then, provides managers with an incentive to perform well, while insulating their compensation from the effect of environmental conditions that also affect the performance of other managers in the same industry or market. To this reasoning, the current discussion adds considerations of an opportunism-mitigating kind. This extended version of RPE seems to provide a compelling theoretical framework for understanding managerial compensation.
This study builds on and extends the literature on RPE -both theoretically and empirically. Its theoretical contribution lies in the previously introduced opportunismmitigation perspective. Furthermore, the research proposal takes an contingency approach to understand the use of RPE. The empirical contribution relates to this research's use of new data sources, namely detailed data on RPE at the business unitlevel. This new data is due to this study's survey approach; where prior studies mainly analyzed data from publicly available databases, this study can take a more in-depth look at RPE-incidence and the variety of forms.
The remainder of this research proposal is organised in four sections. Section 2 reviews prior research on relative performance evaluation and describes a number of research opportunities. The research question is presented in section 3. The fourth section of this research proposal provides the theoretical background of RPE, the preliminary model and the development of the hypotheses. This proposal concludes with a presentation of a summary research plan.
Research opportunities
Despite its promising theoretical basis, the empirical evidence for RPE is at best inconclusive. Both Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) find that RPE is not a prominent feature of executive compensation contracts. Antle and Smith (1986) find some weak support for RPE, but they also present results that are inconsistent with RPE's implications. Janakiraman et al.'s results (1992) are generally negative. Gibbons and Murphy (1990) report strong support, but the interpretation of their results has been criticized quite severely by Janakiram et al. (1992) . Overall, the lack of strong empirical evidence suggests that RPE models have limited descriptive validity.
However, for a number of reasons, I believe that studying RPE can be a fruitful endeavour for understanding performance evaluation practices. There are opportunities of a theoretical and a methodological nature. The remainder of this paragraph describes these opportunities.
Studying RPE at the business unit-level
Prior research almost exclusively studies RPE at the executive level. But, for a number of reasons, RPE might not find its ultimate application amongst CEOs. The first reason is of an opportunism-mitigating kind: RPE at the business-unit level can aid the standard setting process, by comparing the actual performance to peer-output. Because the target levels are externally determined, managers cannot easily influence the height of the performance-standard and negotiate easy target levels for the next period. This leaves less room for managerial opportunism. Furthermore, RPE-based standard setting helps to set the target at a realistic level, dealing with unforeseen and unanalyzable circumstances.
With RPE, the principal ex-ante tells the agent what his relative goal will be (e.g.: 'be the best', or 'perform above average'), but what this means in absolute numbers is determined 'after the fact' (via ex-post comparison with peers), This guarantees a certain 'realism' of the target, because it is determined by similar firms or divisions who realize their targets under the same circumstances. This helps to set challenging but attainable targets, which enables the organization to motivate its managers with targets.
At the CEO level, standard setting seems to be less of an issue. Here, incentives can be directly coupled to the interests of the principal (or: shareholders), without the use of performance standards. This can be accomplished by tying evaluation and compensation directly to firm value, for example through stock returns. This would provide -potentially strong-incentives for the CEO to act in the principal's best interest; to pursue increases in firm market value. Furthermore, these incentives would be undistorted because they can hardly yield too much of 'a good thing' (namely: increases in firm value). This is different at the business unit-level, where standards often also function as instrument to coordinate activities (Leone and Rock, 2002) . For example, in case of intra-firm interdependencies, where rewarding its manager based on some proxy for business unitmarket value could lead to suboptimalization.
1
The existence of other means than standard-setting to provide strong incentives does not disqualify RPE as such for executive compensation. But it can lower RPE's incidence at the executive level whilst RPE might still be present at lower echelons.
The second reason relates to the extant efficient risk-sharing perspective on RPE. As argued in the introduction paragraph, RPE can remove common (e.g. market-specific) risk from the agent's compensation. But, it is entirely possible that (relatively wealthy) executives can undo this undesired market exposure from their incentive contracts themselves, by hedging this common risk with their own investment portfolios. If so, the need for a, potentially costly, RPE-contract decreases. Therefore, the possibility of managerial hedging may limit the reliance on RPE. In support of this argument, Garvey and Milbourn (2003) found that although RPE is not an important feature in the compensation contract of the average manager, it is in fact present for younger and less wealthy executives, i.e. those managers for which personal hedging is likely to be prohibitively costly. If RPE is part of evaluation practices of executives, who are less able to hedge their market-exposure, this strengthens the idea that RPE might very well be part of -on average less wealthy-business unit-managers as well.
Indeed, not much support for RPE has been found at the executive level. Considering both reasons described in this paragraph, I argue that the inconclusive findings for RPE at the CEO level need not discourage us, if studying RPE at the business unit level.
Contingency approach
A second research opportunity lies in another extension of RPE theory, towards a contingency approach. The extant RPE models that most prior research builds on, do not consider the influence of contextual factors on the applicability or desirability of relative performance evaluation. This suggests that RPE is always a good idea, regardless of the circumstances. However, a still growing body of literature argues that 1 An example of 'too much of a good thing' is the case of an overzealous production department, causing congestion in the pipe-line, resulting in high stocking-costs and an overburdened distribution department. circumstances do influence the choice of methods to assess performance, and -more broadly-management control systems (Luft and Shields, 2003; Ittner and Larker, 2001) .
'Contingency theories' contend that there is no universally applicable system of management accounting and control, and that the choice of appropriate accounting and control techniques depends upon the circumstances surrounding an organization (Ittner and Larcker, 2001 ).
In support of the argument that circumstances matter, the influence of such contingencies provides an explanation for empirical findings concerning limited RPE use (e.g.: Bannister and Newman, 2003) . A number of contingency factors are described in the preliminary theoretical model of this proposal, and aim to add to our understanding of RPE.
Direct testing vs. indirect testing
The third research opportunity is based on a methodological issue. Most prior studies do not test RPE-use directly, but rely on indirect testing methods instead 2 . Typically, indirect studies attempt to find support for the RPE-hypothesis by employing regression analyses on publicly available data. Indirect studies do not study the actual contract or the processes from which this data results. Although indirect testing has a number of important advantages, such as the ability to gather larger samples, it also has two drawbacks. The first downside of the indirect approach is the reduced test power. Given the sample size, indirect tests are inevitably weaker statistically than direct tests, since the researcher can only speculate about the details of the contract he or she studies. Then, results' reliability is threatened by, for example, misspecified peer groups, performance measures, compensation metrics, etcetera (Bannister and Newman, 2003; Albuquerque, 2005) .
The second disadvantage is that indirect testing is not suited to pick up detailed information on RPE-manifestations. For example, indirect tests can not differentiate between various forms of RPE, such as formalized, explicit or non-formalized, implicit RPE. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that RPE mainly exists in subtler ways or by different means than previously suggested by the literature. For example, it may be that 2 Examples of 'indirect studies' include: Gibbons and Murphy (1990) , Janakiraman et al. (1992) , Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) , and Garvey and Milbourn (2003) .
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the budget itself or the assumptions and estimates underlying the budgeting process are regularly being 'marked to market'. If this is the case, it could be that the budget is reasonably well protected against both managerial manipulation and common uncertainty. Another possibility is a situation where, instead of peer-comparison using objective performance measures, subjectivity underlies the performance evaluation. Then, a manager's performance evaluation is based on his superior's 'feel' for market conditions, and thus, the performance evaluation is subjectively linked to market situations.
Considering the potential real life variety of RPE, not only the incidence but also RPE's specific manifestations need studying.
Concluding on this research opportunity, exploring the RPE hypothesis with a direct approach seems desirable, especially given the current state of our knowledge of RPE. By employing a questionnaire, interviews or reviewing compensation contracts, direct testing can enable more sophisticated testing of the RPE hypothesis, and go more in-depth.
Conclusion
Overall, there is currently not much empirical support for the RPE hypothesis. But, a number of promising opportunities for further research exist. In this paragraph, opportunities of both theoretical and methodological backgrounds have been discussed.
This study aims to build from these opportunities, seeking further support through theory development and previously unapplied methods to the topic.
Research question
This research proposal aims at theoretically and empirically examining the use of relative performance evaluation at the business unit-manager level, and associating the use of RPE with contingency factors. This goal is made explicit in the following research question:
Can we explain RPE-incidence at the business unit-manager level by associating incidence with contingency factors?
The proposal contains preliminary theory on when and why RPE is used, associated with the organizational context (uncertainty, information asymmetry, asset specificity and managerial power). Besides the theory-driven research question, this study is also partially exploratory in nature. Besides understanding RPE-incidence, the study wants to explain the variety of forms of RPE in practise. Concerning this part of the study no preliminary theory is presented. Currently, the literature does not provide a sufficiently reliable foundation to build such a theory. Instead, the aim is here to map the forms of RPE, and gain insights to provide us with building blocks for future research.
Theory 4.1 From an insurance perspective to opportunism-mitigation
Performance evaluation is considered to gain meaning and accuracy if the agent's performance is compared to the performance of a reference group, in case the agents' performances are affected by common factors (for example, see : Holmström, 1982; Janakiraman et al., 1992) . This phenomenon has been termed in literature relative performance evaluation or RPE. This research proposal views RPE as a means for determining the performance standard and opportunism-mitigation. This approach is new to the RPE literature. To the best of my knowledge, prior studies exclusively approached the RPE phenomenon from an informativeness and efficient risk sharing perspective (see : Holmström, 1982) .
Extant RPE models argue that -because measured performance is almost always affected by factors beyond the agent's control-contracts based solely on observed individual outcomes expose the agent to substantial risk. However, when these risk-inducing factors are partially typical to a reference group, RPE-based contracts would filter out these uncertainties. This is how the performance of peers is informative about the agent's actions; by filtering out common external -often uncontrollable-factors, relative performance evaluation provides the principal with better insights in the agent's true effort (Janakiraman et al., 1992) . The principal and the agent now can write a more efficient contract, with both parties being less exposed to risk.
However, the preliminary theory presented here views RPE from a different angle, that of opportunism-mitigation and target-setting, where RPE contributes to the determination of performance-standards. This approach comes into play at lower hierarchical levels, especially at the business unit level. At the business unit-level, performance standards (in the form of budgets and targets 3 ) play an important role in management control. Despite their central place in management accounting and control practise, budgets and targets are widely known to potentially cause severe damage to organizations (Onsi, 1973; Hansen et al., 2003; Jensen, 2003) . Budgets' and targets' negative effects on control have often been traced back to dysfunctional performance measures and non-linearities in the pay-performance relation. Less studied, but also a cause of these effects, is the performance standard, and how it is determined. Literature claims that there is a limited number of ways to determine performance standards (see, for example: Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Murphy, 2001) . Murphy (2001) In contrast to internally determined standards, externally determined standards are not (as easily) affected by managerial actions. Consider the case of an RPE-based contract, where contemporaneous performance is compared to peer-performance: the performance standard is externally defined ex-post by 'the market'. This market consists of a reference group with agents whose performances are affected by the same uncertainties, and thus, who are exposed to the same risk (preferably both in nature and level). Since peer performance is relatively hard to influence for the manager, the manager cannot influence the performance standard to which he is evaluated. This 3 When, in this research proposal, the term budget is used, it refers to budgets deployed as targets. Other reasons-to-budget are, for example, for operational planning, communication of goals, and strategy formulation (Hansen and Van der Stede, 2004) complicates engaging in dysfunctional behaviour, and mitigates (from the principal's perspective) undesired managerial opportunism.
Provision of powerful incentives and an exploration of a coordination role.
This paper views RPE as a means to induce motivation of organizational members (in this study specifically: business-unit managers) 4 . This research proposal claims that RPE can be helpful to motivate managers, because it can aid the calibration of the incentivezone in performance-contracts, where the managers performance will lead to a bonus.
The motivating character of targets in compensation schemes has been studied extensively. When targets are used to motivate managers, typical dysfunctionalities arise.
These dysfunctionalities are mostly related to the calibration of the incentive-zone.
Performance evaluation (and subsequent rewarding) motivates to provide high effort, as long as the manager believes his effort has an effect on his rewards. Such compensation systems only have strong motivational properties when the actual performance lies in the incentive zone, because only then, the manager will receive a variable bonus, dependent on his performance. Consider the compensation scheme in figure 1 (conform: Murphy, 2001; Jensen, 2003) The incentive-zone refers to the part of the reported performance, for which the manager receives a bonus. In figure 1 , this zone is marked as I. In this area, the system is motivating the manager to provide high effort, without increased risk of managerial opportunism.
Around the edges of the incentive-zone (indicated as zones II.1 and II.2), the threat of opportunistic behaviour increases. The system strongly induces gaming. In zone II.1, reporting a higher then actual performance is stimulated by the system, in order to just reach the hurdle bonus. In zone II.2, it serves the manager's interests better to not report 4 Management control instruments in general, and targets specifically, can also be deployed as means for coordination of organisational activities. Concerning this other role of management control instruments, RPE's fitness for coordinating activities is assumed to be low. Since RPE abandons preset absolute performance goals -which enable forecasting required capacities-the planning and allocation of resources becomes more difficult. Especially for organisations with much or complex interdependencies (reflected in high asset specificity), this is likely to lower reliance on relative performance evaluation. The link between interdependencies and asset specificity will be discussed in the operationalization of the model (not included in this research proposal).
performance that exceeds the target with more then -in the example-20 percent. 
Contingency approach
This study introduces a preliminary framework of contingency factors that furthers our understanding of RPE at the business unit-manager level. Contingency theories contend that there is no universally applicable system of management accounting and control, and that the choice of appropriate accounting and control instruments or techniques depends upon the circumstances surrounding an organization (Ittner and Larcker, 2001 ).
Prior RPE literature generally did not take on the position that circumstances matter, but rather builds on the assumption that performance evaluation always benefits from peercomparison, regardless of the organizational context. In contrast to prior studies, this research proposal presents preliminary theory to argue that certain contextual factors influence whether or not organizations deploy RPE. Although the literature associates numerous contingency factors with management control choices 5 , the theory presented here deliberately describes only a small number of factors, which are fundamental to RPE-use. Why I believe that specifically these factors describe the core of the problem, will be argued in the next sub-paragraphs. Figure 2 illustrates the associations between the RPE-incidence and the contingency variables. The remains of this paragraph describes the individual contingency factors.
First, the independent variables which primarily relate to firms' need for RPE will be discussed (the desirability variables). Subsequently, two ability-decreasing factors will be Unfortunately, most organizations do not operate in a hyperrational Nirwana, and therefore need instruments to face the challenges of unforeseen externalities and incomplete, costly information. Both desirability variables (environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry) can cause a shortage of information: the principal will have insufficient information to determine an attainable performance standard. This potentially leaves room for managerial opportunism. Because RPE can provide informative performance standards, it makes a contribution to solving this information gap. Already in the earliest RPE papers, RPE set out to address these two factors, described in terms of informativeness and (common) uncertainty (Holmström, 1982) .
More specifically, Holmström describes how peer-comparison can be informative -and hence, reduce the information insufficiencies concerning the attainability of performance standards-by filtering out common uncertainty. Environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry form the basis of the desirability of relative performance evaluation. (conform: Holmström, 1982; Murphy, 2001) .
Environmental uncertainty
Uncertainty can have many origins, of which the external environment is amongst the most widely researched aspects. Uncertainty is present in situations in which probabilities cannot be attached to future events, or when even the future events themselves may not be predictable (Chenhall, 2003) . Uncertainty is found to make up front programming difficult, and high levels of uncertainty require maintaining flexibility to allow adaptation to events as they unfold and to information as it accrues becomes imperative (Speklé, 2001; .
Uncertainty is often due to the external environment. So called environmental uncertainty is a powerful contextual variable that is at the foundation of contingencybased research (Chenhall, 2003) . It is this specific form of uncertainty which's consequences are addressed by relative performance evaluation. RPE is only suited to filter out common risk. This common nature of the uncertainties is essential for RPE for informativeness-reasons (Holmström, 1982) ; because also the performance of peers is influenced by these common shocks, common risk can inform the principal the circumstances under which the agent had to perform. Only external circumstances are shared by peers, and affect the performance of all reference-group members.
Indeed; also other shades and colours of uncertainty can 'cause problems' by complicating forecasting, hinder target setting, and affect performance, but only environmental uncertainties are common, and can be reduced by RPE.
In a highly uncertain environment, RPE not only gains desirability, but non-RPE types of performance evaluation also lose theirs. This is because performance evaluation based on traditional, ex-ante determined targets requires forecasting, and forecasting becomes more difficult with increasing levels of uncertainty, since it involves highly uncertain future circumstances. This seriously reduces the applicability of non-RPE types of performance evaluation. But, RPE does not require forecasting, since it relies on ex-post target setting. As opposed to traditional, absolute performance evaluation, RPE is better able to deal with an unpredictable, uncertain environment. Therefore, with high environmental uncertainty, more use of RPE is expected. Hence, the first hypothesis is the following: 
Information asymmetry
Information asymmetry, relating to the information gap between principal and agent, is often described (both theoretically and empirically) to be the core of agency problems: it is the combination of information asymmetry and the agent's aversion both to work and risk that steer him away from cooperative behaviour (Holmström, 1982; Kunz and Pfaff, 2002) . This sub-paragraph argues that RPE can make a substantial contribution to solving the target-setting problems caused by information asymmetries.
Setting an appropriate and reliable target can be problematic when a subordinate has better information than a superior about factors that influence performance, especially when the agents pay depends on his performance vis-à-vis the target (conform: Chow et al., 1988) . These information asymmetries occur when lower-level managers have specific knowledge about the functioning of the division that is either unavailable to corporate management, or is too costly for the principal to obtain (Abernethy et al., 2004; Christie et al., 2003; Dunk, 1993) .
In contrast to situations of high uncertainty -where both the principal and the agent cannot judge the attainability of a performance target up front-, high levels of information asymmetry hinder only the principal 6 . The agent -who is considered to have superior insights about the mechanisms that drive performance-might rely on selfinterest seeking behaviour with guile, which can result in misrepresentation towards the principal and building budgetary slack (Dunk, 1993; Chow et al., 1988 , Fisher et al., 2002 .
Through relative performance evaluation, the principal can let the peer-group 'decide' the height of the performance standard, without the need to understand the ins and outs of the business unit and the factors that drive its performance. This way, the principal works 6 Information asymmetry can go both ways: it is also possible that the principal has information about the business unit, which the agent has not. However, this study specifically looks into information asymmetries where the agent has superior information (conform: Abernethy et al., 2004) around the business unit to assess its manager's effort, instead of obtaining the -costly or just unavailable-information required to in-depth evaluate the business unit.
The prediction this study makes is that RPE will be used especially amongst organizations facing high information asymmetry. Therefore, the effect of information asymmetry is explicated as:
Information asymmetry positively influences the use of relative performance evaluation.
The ability variables
Whereas the previous section described 'desirability-enhancing' factors for organizational reliance on RPE, this section discusses some important necessary conditions for RPEincidence. These factors, both from economical and behavioural backgrounds, are expected to disable the use of RPE for target setting and motivational purposes, and are modelled as moderating variables.
Both factors are, similar to the desirability variables, argued to be at the core of RPE. Asset specificity relates to the level of comparability amongst agents. Without comparability (or here: with high levels of asset specificity), no meaningful, informative comparison amongst agents can be made. The managerial power variable has a broader background; this factor does not solely stem from agency theory or contingency literature, but is also supported by behavioural literature and wide recognition by practitioners. Especially the latter argue the urgency of the inclusion of managerial power when explaining performance evaluation and compensation.
Asset specificity
Asset specificity concerns the (opportunity costs of the) investments made to support the products, activities, or processes of a business unit (conform: Speklé, 2004) . Based on Transaction Cost Economics reasoning, Speklé (2001; argues that the informativeness of externally determined performance standards depends on asset specificity; the lower the degree of asset specificity, the better these standards represent efficient performance. If a division produces highly specific products or services, or relies heavily on specific processes, the division's uniqueness reduces the comparability of performance with other firms or business units. This is problematic for the appliance of RPE, since comparability is at the very heart of RPE. A sufficient number of reasonably comparable peers is needed to build an objective point of reference to form the target level to which the agent's performance is measured.
In other words, only a large enough reference-group can substitute the market including its external shocks, which RPE aims to eliminate from the agent's performance.
Although the principal might want to tie the targets to the market, high levels of asset specificity can frustrate the much needed comparability. As a result, internally determined target setting might be the only feasible option.
But, asset specificity does not drive RPE-incidence in a direct manner. The sheer ability to compare with peers (i.e.: low asset specificity) does not cause peer-comparison, it just makes it possible. Therefore, no main effect between asset specificity and RPE-use is hypothesized. Instead, this study predicts moderating effects of asset specificity on the two main relations hypothesized in H 1 and H 2 . High values of asset specificity will weaken the relation between environmental uncertainty and RPE-use, and between information asymmetry and RPE-use.
Therefore, the claim is that asset specificity negatively influences reliance on RPE, not directly but only via environmental uncertainty and information asymmetry, formalized as: 
Managerial power
Managerial power is defined here as the ability of managers to influence or exert their will or desires to others, for example on the remuneration decisions made by the board of directors, or by the compensation committee of the board. This definition is in line with Finkelstein (1992) , Lambert et al. (1993) , and Grinstein et al. (2004) , who generally find significant and positive effects of managerial power on CEO compensation. These empirical findings are theory-consistent: under the managerial power approach, there should be a positive correlation between the level of compensation and the level of managerial power in the firm; managerial skill and performance should play a secondary role in explaining the variability in compensation (Grinstein et al., 2004) .
However, two main differences exist between the application of the managerial power approach sketched above, and the view which this proposal adopts. Firstly, the managerial power approach has been exclusively studied at the top-management level, whereas this research proposal has a different level of analysis. This study applies managerial power at the business-unit level, where nonetheless, I assume, similar forces are at work. Nonetheless, it is likely that lower in the hierarchy managerial power levels are significantly lower.
Secondly, prior studies deploy managerial power to explain the height of compensation, not the structure of the compensation contract behind it. Explaining the height of compensation seems evident, given the unwritten assumption that everyone -including CEOs and business unit-managers-prefers more compensation over less. However, this study is concerned with explaining RPE-use, instead of the height of compensation. It poses a different assumption.
This research proposal argues that managers generally prefer a non-RPE based contract over an RPE-based contract. RPE is not necessarily a manager's first best solution, because of the risk it exposes the manager to (who is generally considered to be riskaverse). Although RPE is can shield the manager from risk, compared to a 'regular' performance-based compensation contract (as discussed in paragraph 4.1 from an insurance perspective to opportunism-mitigation), it is not as secure as a fixed-pay contract. This lowers the attractiveness of RPE from a managerial point of view. Also, managerial preference for non-RPE based contracts receives support from the behavioural literature. Fershtman et al. (2003) also claim that managers prefer non-RPE contracts, whereby the authors rely on the human tendency to derive utility from earning more than others. The general idea is that managers care not only about their own wage, but also prefer their compensation to be positively related to the wages of other managers (Fershtman et al., 2003) . This suggests that -for as far as it lies within their power-managers will negotiate a contract that yields more compensation than their peers, regardless the circumstances.
Casual conversation with managers and compensation consultants 7 provides support for these ideas. Interviewees argue that at top and middle-manager levels, managerial power negatively influences the use of RPE.
The applicability of relative performance evaluation -as a means for standard setting and remuneration-is seriously weakened when managers ultimately influence their own pay via managerial power instead of effort. Managerial power would allow them to negotiate a contract which makes this possible. Therefore, RPE will lose it motivating properties when managerial power is high, despite it still provides an objective performance target.
Similar to the discussion about asset specificity, managerial power does not cause RPEincidence directly. Again, this study predicts no main effect between this managerial power and RPE-use. Instead, this study hypothesizes moderating effects of managerial power on the two main relations hypothesized in H 1 and H 2 . High values of managerial power will weaken the relation between environmental uncertainty and RPE-use, and between information asymmetry and RPE-use.
Consequently, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
Research plan
The aim of this research proposal is to highlight the relevance of studying RPE at lower hierarchical levels, and to build theory that helps us to explain the (non-)use of RPE at the business unit-managers. Such a preliminary theory is presented in paragraph 4.
Furthermore, as brought forward in the research question, this study sets out to explain the variety of forms of RPE in practise. This part of the research question will be studied inductively, since no solid theoretical expectations can be build from prior literature.
7 These conversations include discussions with the CEO of a major Dutch housing association and an executive compensation specialist from Towers Perrin.
To answer the research question, this project involves a quantitative, large sample empirical study. Given the paucity of prior research in this area, it is unlikely that I can rely fully on existing datasets. To ensure a substantial and high-quality response, I plan to administer a survey through the NIVRA-Nyenrode network of professional controllers (current students of the MSc in Controlling programme). Recent experience shows that this is in fact a feasible solution to mitigate response problems.
